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Almost 30 professors in the areas of 
ﬁ  nance, money and macroeconomics, and 
corporate and ﬁ  nancial law* moved into 
the new House of Finance (HoF) building 
at Frankfurt’s Goethe University nine 
m o n t h s  a g o .  T h e y  w e r e  j o i n e d  b y  1 2 0  
research assistants and 50 administrative 
staff members.  
Together we pursue the vision that inter-
disciplinary research and teaching provide 
better answers to the imminent challenges for 
the ﬁ  nancial world. We strive for high quali-
ty research that is published widely, including 
top international journals, as well as for further 
enhancing the transfer of knowledge towards 
business and civil society. 
W e  h a v e  m a d e  s u b s t a n t i a l  p r o g r e s s  i n  i n -
tegrating the different disciplines in the HoF, 
in fostering a public-private research and 
teaching partnership, and  in cooperating with 
the various independent  institutes that are also 
located within the HoF. Moreover, against the 
background of these immense challenges we 
still – no wonder – have a very long way to go.
In order to provide the general public as well as 
the numerous HoF stakeholders with concentra-
ted information on this deepening integration 
process, we have designed this newsletter. The 
newsletter, which will be issued on a quarterly 
basis, will also offer some of the latest research 
ﬁ  ndings, plus news about executive education 
at the HoF. It can be sent to you at your request 
in either printed or digital format.
Each issue will comprise a description of 
three research results – of two pages each – 
complemented by an interview, an editorial, 
and also some notes on publications produced 
outside the HoF. 
W e hope that you will ﬁ  nd the newsletter 
concise, exciting, and highly relevant.  We 
want to ensure that it is as useful as possib-
le, so please let us know if you would like to 
propose any changes (see page 2 for contact in-
formation). We will only have a serious chance 
of reaching our goals if we deepen the integra-
tion within the HoF step-by-step, and if we are 
capable of appropriately integrating important 
outside academics and practitioners into our 
work. Thus, we ask you for your cooperation 
and we thank you for all your support in this 
regard.
With best wishes,
Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Otmar Issing
Chairman of the Council of the House of Finance  
Editorial
Ladies and gentleman, 
dear friends of the House of Finance,
*   In addition, researchers for Information Systems, 
Mathematics, and Computer Science complement 
the pool of talent in the HoF. Research 1 ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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Is there a case for
REGULATING 
COMPENSATION
According to conventional wisdom, one of the main factors behind the current ﬁ  nancial 
crisis is the prevalence of bonus-driven compensation schemes in the ﬁ  nancial industry. Because 
investment bankers, mortgage brokers, etc. receive bonuses that are mainly based on yearly or 
even shorter-term measures of success (e.g., most extremely in the form of a ﬁ  xed upfront commission), 
they take little account of the longer-term risks imposed by their speciﬁ  c transactions. Common 
wisdom then goes on to conclude that because of this, ﬁ  nancial institutions have taken on too 
much risk. Consequently, practitioners as well as academic scholars demand regulatory interven-
tion. In particular, they demand that ﬁ  nancial institutions should be forced to defer substantial 
parts of the bonus pool.
While, at least with hindsight, ﬁ  nancial institutions have taken on too much risk (both with 
respect to their own interest and with respect to overall ﬁ  nancial stability), bonus-driven incentive sche-
mes are not the cause, but the means through which this risk imbalance was created. As regards 
the design of compensation schemes, ﬁ  nancial institutions – at least, when they are well gover-
ned – trade-off the costs of compensation and incentives so as to maximise proﬁ  ts. The argument 
that they fail to do so, e.g., as they ﬁ  nd themselves in a rat race to attract the best staff, is utter 
nonsense: for the right risk premium in the form of higher compensation, any banker will accept 
a more long-term incentive plan. But banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions were obviously not 
willing to pay this premium or, for that matter, to rein in risk-taking incentives at all. 
They themselves had a high appetite for risk. 
This suggests, however, that the means to curb risk-taking incentives, provided that this is in the 
social interest, can be found in the standard toolbox; most notably through stricter capital ade-
quacy requirements. If there is a justiﬁ  cation for meddling with ﬁ  rms’ internal wage strategies, 
then at least the proponents of such corrective actions have not proposed a convincing argument 
so far.
Against this background, one contribution of the theoretical work by Roman Inderst and 
Sebastian Pfeil is to provide a consistent rationale for regulating compensation in the proposed 
way. But it equally shows the severe shortcomings of such interference. Their academic work 
derives in a logically consistent way conditions for when forcing banks to defer bonus compensa-
tion will indeed result in less risky transactions. But it also shows that this may have the uninten-
ded consequence of leading to a lower quality of assets and higher risk.
At the heart of their analysis, as well as of much of modern banking theory, lie agency pro-
blems: in this case, the interaction of an internal agency problem within the ﬁ  nancial institution 
and an external agency problem vis-á-vis the buyers of securities issued by the bank. The internal 
agency problem stems from delegation, e.g., of loan origination to the respective loan ofﬁ  cer.  &
Prof. Roman Inderst ￿ Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
Sebastian Pfeil ￿ Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
In a recent paper, Roman Inderst and Sebastian Pfeil assess the case for forcing ﬁ  nancial 
institutions to defer bonus payments, as it is proposed by numerous top-ranking politici-
ans. The intention here is to thereby realign individual incentives with the long-term risk 
of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. 
in the Financial Industry?Research 1 ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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A crucial conﬂ  ict of interest arises from the multi-task nature of the agent’s job, which typically 
involves both generating new transactions and, at the same time, performing due diligence in the 
assessment of such transactions. Deferred compensation can help to overcome this conﬂ  ict of in-
terest, albeit at a cost, as employees will then require a higher risk and liquidity premium as part 
of their compensation packages. Short-term and high-powered incentives are, instead, cheaper for 
the ﬁ  nancial institution, albeit leading to the erosion of the quality of deals.
Securitisation allows a ﬁ  nancial institution to shed some or even all of the risk, increasing 
the incentive to resort to such short-term and more high-powered compensation. Rational in-
vestors should, at least in the long term and in the absence of other motives (such as regulatory 
arbitrage), anticipate such behaviour, and shy away from the respective papers. In terms of eco-
nomic theory, securitisation thus creates a deep-rooted incentive problem between a bank and 
the potential buyers of the securities it issues. This problem is aggravated by the internal agency 
conﬂ  ict within banks themselves. 
Without regulatory interference, banks may not be able to credibly commit to a high quality 
of the securitised assets, i.e., to closely monitor asset quality and to provide their agents with less 
deal-oriented incentives.
This is where policy interference could come in. 
By forcing ﬁ  nancial institutions to defer compensation, they could be induced to use the additi-
onal, long-term information, e.g., on early default or the (market) re-pricing of certain tranches. 
The key result of the modeling exercise is to derive conditions when this is, however, coun-
ter-productive: it then makes high-powered, deal-oriented incentives relatively cheaper, which 
further undermines the institution’s commitment problem and leads to a decline in average asset 
quality. 
On the other hand, the model helps to delineate the conditions for when such interference 
could improve social welfare, even when imposed against banks’ own interests. This is more likely 
to be the case when buyers of securities do not properly assess the strategic incentives banks have 
to erode (over time) the quality of securitised deals. But when regulation is willing to micro-mana-
ge ﬁ  nancial institutions’ compensation or their business strategies, regulators could, alternatively, 
impose limits on securitisation (e.g., through mandatory retention of “ﬁ  rst-loss tranches”).
Further work will analyse whether and when such policies have indeed the intended consequences of 
improving social welfare and when this is not the case.
The article is available at:
http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/profs/inderst/Corporate_Finance_and_Banking/inderst_pfeil_bankerbonuspay_draft1.pdfResearch 2 ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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In our article, we attempt to make sense of 
the current fair value debate and discuss 
whether many of the arguments hold up 
to further scrutiny.  
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis has turned the spot-
light on fair value accounting (FVA) and led to 
a major policy debate involving, among others, 
the US Congress, the European Commission 
as well as banking and accounting regulators 
around the world. Critics argue that FVA has 
signiﬁ  cantly contributed to the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
and exacerbated its severity for ﬁ  nancial ins-
titutions in the US and around the world. On 
the other hand, proponents of FVA argue that 
it merely played the role of the proverbial mes-
senger that invariably gets shot.  In our article, 
we attempt to make sense of the current fair va-
lue debate and derive four main conclusions.
Firstly, much of the controversy about FVA 
results from confusion about what is new and 
different about FVA as well as different views 
about the purpose of FVA. Under both United 
States Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (US GAAP) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), there is a mixed 
attribute model with a multitude of rules 
stipulating that some items are reported at fair 
value and that others are reported at histori-
cal cost. Moreover, unrealised gains and losses 
of items that are reported at fair value may or 
may not affect net income, depending on their 
classiﬁ  cation. For instance, Financial Accoun-
ting Standards 115 (FAS 115), which was al-
ready implemented in 1994, requires that both 
trading securities and available-for-sale securi-
ties (AFS) are reported in the balance sheet at 
fair value. But in the income statement, unre-
alised gains and losses, i.e., changes in these 
values, are recognised for trading securities 
only.  In contrast, ﬁ  nancial instruments that 
are held to maturity are reported at amortised 
costs. Therefore, one has to be careful about the 
extent to which arguments against FVA apply 
to current accounting standards or to full FVA 
for all assets and liabilities. The debate about 
FVA takes us back to several old accounting 
issues, like the trade-off between relevance and 
reliability, which have been debated for deca-
des. Except in rare circumstances, standard 
setters will always face these issues and trade-
offs; FVA is just another example.
In discussing the potential problems of FVA, 
it is important to also consider the alternative.   
Even if one is sympathetic to the arguments 
against FVA, it does not automatically follow 
that historical cost accounting (HCA) would be 
better. At times, FVA may not provide relevant 
information, but in many cases, (amortised) 
historical cost accounting (HCA) does not pro-
vide relevant information either. Even for assets 
that are held to maturity (e.g., loans), investors 
might care about current market values. Mo-
reover, it is surprising that some commentators 
seem to believe that HCA is a sound basis for 
capital requirements or that the liquidity of an 
asset should play no role when market values 
and liquidity play an important role in deter-
mining (ongoing) margin or collateral requi-
rements.
Secondly, there are legitimate concerns about 
marking asset values to market prices in times 
of ﬁ  nancial crisis once we recognise that the-
re are ties to contracts and regulation or that 
managers and investors may care about mar-
ket reactions over the short term.  However, 
it is not obvious that these problems are best 
addressed with changes to the accounting sys-
tem. These problems could also (and perhaps 
more appropriately) be addressed by adjusting 
contracts and regulation. Such adjustments al-
ready exist. For example, regulatory capital as 
calculated by US banking regulators is not af-
fected by changes in the fair value of AFS debt 
securities, unless they are sold or the impair-
ments are “other-than-temporary”. Therefore, 
a shock to AFS debt securities has the same 
effect on Tier 1 regulatory capital under FVA 
and HCA for US banks. Moreover, the concern 
about the downward spiral is most pronounced 
for FVA in its pure form, but it does not apply in 
the same way to FVA as stipulated by US GAAP 
or IFRS. Both standards allow for deviations 
from market prices under certain circumstan-
ces (e.g., prices from ﬁ  re sales). Thus, it is not 
clear that the standards themselves are the 
source of the problem.
However, as our third conclusion highlights, 
there could be implementation problems in 
practice. It is important to recognise that ac-
counting rules interact with other elements of 
the institutional framework, which could give 
rise to unintended consequences. For instance, 
we point out that managers’ concerns about 
litigation could make a deviation from mar-
ket prices less likely even when this would be 
appropriate. Concerns about Securities Ex-
change Commission enforcement could have 
similar effects. At the same time, it is impor-
tant to recognise that giving management more 
ﬂ  exibility to deal with the potential problems of 
FVA also opens the door for manipulation. For 
instance, managers could use deviations from 
allegedly depressed market values to avoid los-
The Crisis of Fair Value Accounting: Making Sense of the Recent Debate
&
Christian Laux ￿ Goethe University Frankfurt & Center for Financial Studies
Christian Leuz ￿ The University of Chicago Booth School of Business & National 
Bureau of Economic ResearchResearch 2 ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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Balance Sheet Income Statement Effect on Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital 
(FDIC and Federal Reserve)
Equity investment;
debt securities;
securitized assets 
Trading Assets Reported at FV FV changes through income statement
Changes in FV affect Tier 1 capital through effect 
on earnings
AFS Securities Reported at FV
FV changes are reported in OCI
no effect on income unless realized: a) 
sales or b) OTTI, in which case the as-
set is written down to FV; no reversal of 
write-down
Effect on income statement akin to HCA 
with write-downs to FV if OTTI
OCI affects shareholders’ equity, but adjustments 
for regulatory purposes so that unrealized FV 
changes in OCI of 
￿   AFS debt securities have no effect on Tier 1 
or Tier 2 capital
￿   AFS equity securities reduce Tier 1 capital if 
net loss 
￿   AFS equity securities (includible in Tier 2 
capital) increase Tier 2 capital if net gain
HTM Securities
Reported at HC unless OTTI, in which case the asset is writ-
ten down to FV; subsequent recovery in fair value not reco-
gnized until security is sold.
Direct investment in loans
HFI
Reported at HC net of loan loss reserves and tested for im-
pairments for probable losses (if event has been incurred as 
of measurement date) Realized losses and write-downs affect Tier 1 
capital through effect on earnings
HFS
Reported at lower-of-cost or fair value – declines recog-
nized in income   
Fair value option 
(FAS 159)
Entities are allowed to elect FV measurement (FV through 
income statement) for most ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities 
￿ Applied on instrument by instrument basis
￿ Irrevocable once selected
Adjustments so that unrealized FV changes due 
to changes in the bank’s own creditworthiness 
have no effect on Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital
AFS – Available for sale  HFS – Held for sale  OCI – Other comprehensive income
HTM –  Held to maturity  FV – Fair value  OTTI – Other than temporary impairments
HFI – Held for investment     HC – Historical cost  FDIC – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
TABLE 1: Key Accounting Rules
ses and impairments. Judging from evidence 
for other areas in accounting (e.g., loans and 
goodwill) as well as the US savings and loans 
crisis, this concern should not be underesti-
mated. Thus, standard setters and enforcement 
agencies face a delicate trade-off (e.g., between 
contagion effects and timely impairment).
Fourthly, we emphasise that a return to HCA 
is unlikely to be a remedy for the problems 
with FVA. HCA has its own set of problems, 
and it is possible that for certain assets they are 
as  s e v e r e ,  o r  e v e n  w o rs e ,  than  th e  p r o b l e ms  
with FVA. For instance, HCA likely provides in-
centives to engage in so-called “gains trading” 
or to securitise and sell assets. Moreover, lack of 
transparency under HCA could make matters 
worse during crises.
We conclude our article with several suggestions for 
future research.
The article is forthcoming in Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society and available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1392645Research 3 ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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Through a qualitative case study in 
the ﬁ  nancial services sector, we de-
monstrate how cross-cultural diffe-
rences can be „negotiated“ in practice 
in order to reap the economic beneﬁ  ts 
from IT offshore outsourcing.
Culture can “make or break” an IT offshore 
project
In a recently published international bestseller, 
Thomas Friedman suggests that the world is 
“ﬂ  at” in the sense that globalisation has enlar-
ged the competitive markets for “global players” 
to a global scale (Friedman 2005). One of the 
business opportunities derived from globalisa-
tion involves taking advantage of IT offshore 
outsourcing, namely the sourcing of IT-related 
products and services from low cost countries 
such as India. 
At ﬁ  rst sight, it seems as if the world really has 
become “ﬂ  at”, as the title of Friedman’s book 
indicates, and that distance no longer matters. 
However, the reality is that ﬁ  rms are having a 
hard time when it comes to IT offshoring due 
to various obstacles, including cultural diffe-
rences. Empirical research has revealed that 
critical factors such as coping with differences 
in culture or social behaviour can determine 
success in reducing such “extra costs” and in 
managing the risks of client-vendor distance 
(Dibbern et al. 2008).
Since 2007 we have been analysing a large-
scale IT project aimed at re-engineering a core 
banking system for a large European bank.
A vendor company from India was contrac-
ted for this project. Our analysis comprises 46 
qualitative expert interviews, including addi-
tional ﬁ  eld observations from work conducted 
in India.
TABLE 1:  Client Behaviour and Vendor Adaptation
Client Behaviour Vendor’s Cognitive (C), Motivational (M), and Behavioural (B) Cultural Intelligence
#1)   Frank/direct communication
and transparency
Learned about client’s communication style through face-to-face interactions (C); started to recognise that transparency and 
openness in communication was important to avoid misunderstandings (M); adapted behaviour by saying “no” and commu-
nicating critical issues openly to the client when necessary (B).
#2)   Desire for perfection 
(100% solution)
Learned about client’s desire for perfection when ﬁ  rst vendor deliverables and unmet client expectations led to conﬂ  icts and 
discussions (C); developed appreciation for client’s focus on high quality, which stimulated a motivation to improve the quality 
of deliverables (M); improved the quality of deliverables and focused more strongly on details (B).
#3)   “Zero risk” approach: 
extensive controlling 
for operational risks
Learned about the project’s context and developed a deeper understanding of the associated risks (C); started to recognise the 
negative implications of possible risks (M); adapted the intensity and frequency of tests before delivering new software modules 
for the client to activate (B).
The Role of Cultural Intelligence 
for the Emergence of Negotiated Culture 
in IT Offshore Outsourcing Projects
By Robert Gregory, Michael Priﬂ  ing, Roman Beck, and Wolfgang König The Emergence of a “Negotiated Culture” 
For IT offshore project members with diverse 
s o c i o - c u l t u r a l  b a c k g r o u n d s  t o  i n t e r a c t  e f ﬁ  ci-
ently with each other, a cognitive understan-
ding of the other person’s behaviour is crucial. 
The individual must also be able to carefully 
and delicately elicit the objective cultural ele-
ments of behaviour. Culture is thereby deﬁ  ned 
as having subjective (rules, norms, roles, and 
values) and objective components (legal, eco-
nomic, political, religious, and educational sys-
tems), as  Research 3 ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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TABLE 2: Vendor Behaviour and Client Adaptation
Vendor Behaviour Client’s Cognitive (C), Motivational (M), and Behavioural (B) Cultural Intelligence
#1)“Just do it and get things 
done” attitude, focus on imple-
mentation
Learned that vendor staff under-emphasised planning, but worked fast and efﬁ  ciently to get implementation tasks done (C); 
started to recognise the advantages of getting things done quickly, even in critical times (M); invested more time in structu-
ring, assigning, and later controlling implementation tasks in order to give the vendor more guidance and assistance, and to 
capitalise on the vendor’s strengths (B)
#2) Focus on workability of 
results rather than perfection
Learned after receiving the ﬁ  rst vendor deliverables that the vendor’s attitude to quality differed from own expectations (C); 
recognised that initial expectations were partly unrealistic and that more effort had to be invested in communicating expec-
tations to the vendor (M); adapted initial expectations and engaged in detailed questioning of results in order to stimulate a 
sense of perfection on the part of vendor staff (B).
#3) Avoiding confrontations and 
displeasing or disagreeing with 
anyone
Learned about vendor’s attitude towards conﬂ  icts, the “face-saving” mentality, and the role given to respect (C); started to 
respect vendor’s attitude and noticed that behaviour was deeply rooted in values and beliefs that could not be changed (M); 
focused on interpreting hidden messages, phrasing questions adequately (e.g., by avoiding “yes/no” questions), and acknow-
ledged the importance of respect in interpersonal interaction (B).
REFERENCES:
Ang, S., Inkpen, A.C. (2008) “Cultural 
Intelligence and Offshore Outsourcing Success: A 
Framework of Firm-Level Intercultural Capability,” 
Decision Sciences (39:3), pp 337-358.
Dibbern, J., Winkler, J., and Heinzl, A. 
(2008) “Explaining Variations in Client Extra 
Costs Between Software Projects Offshored to India,” 
MIS Quarterly (32:2), pp 333-366.
Friedman, T. L. (2005) The World is Flat: A 
Brief History of the Twenty-ﬁ  rst Century, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, New York, USA.
Summary:
I n  s u m m a r y ,  o u r  c a s e  a n a l y s i s  d e l i v e r s  s o m e  
answers as to how managers for the above client 
can reduce extra costs in an IT offshore outsour-
cing project. Client and vendor companies need 
to foster and enable the development of cultural 
intelligence.
Ang and Inkpen suggest (2008). In our case 
study, we observed numerous adaptations from 
both sides, with each having a cognitive, a mo-
tivational, and a behavioral dimension (see 
Tables 1 and 2). Besides cognitive understan-
ding, a motivation for cross-cultural interac-
tion was required. Over time, client and vendor 
staff learned about each other and developed 
COGNITIVE CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE
￿   subjective cultural understanding
￿   objective cultural understanding
MOTIVATIONAL CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE
￿ personal goals
￿   curiosity
￿ fulﬁ  llment of expectations
￿   self-efﬁ  cacy
NEGOTIATED CULTURE IN IT OFFSHORE 
OUTSOURCING PROJECTS
￿ interpersonal trust
￿   conﬂ  ict resolution
￿ shared understanding BEHAVIORAL CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE:
CROSS CULTURAL ADAPTION
a deeper cognitive sympathy for each other’s 
culture. This, combined with high motivation 
to interact with each other, led to culturally in-
telligent behaviour, which ultimately resulted 
in mutual trust.
Adaptation and learning by both client and 
vendor project members led to the emergence of 
a “negotiated culture”, which can be deﬁ  ned as 
the sum of compromises and innovations that 
are negotiated around those differences in be-
haviours and expectations that are problematic 
in a given cross-cultural setting. The model in 
Figure 1 provides a summary of this process.
FIGURE 1:Interview ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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David Marsh reports in his new book, 
„The Euro – the Politics of the New Global Cur-
rency”, that in the last 10 years the „Italian 
euro“ has gained more than 40 per cent in va-
lue against the „German euro.“
Newsletter:  Where does the euro zone face these 
discrepancies and how long can these be ﬁ  nanced?
David Marsh: According to a report on compe-
titiveness by the European Commission, the 
distortions are most serious in the case of Gree-
ce, Portugal and Spain. 
Measuring real (inﬂ  ation-adjusted)  ex-
change rate changes is difﬁ  cult, but the Com-
mission reckons that – without EMU – the wea-
ker currencies would have had to be adjusted 
downwards by 30 per cent against the D-mark 
over the past 10 years, that is, if it were to still 
exist.
The Euro – Nominal Stabilization versus 
  Destabilization of Real Values
T h e  e u r o  z o n e  b r i n g s  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  
nominal exchange rates, but this is 
accompanied by destabilization of real 
values between some member states.
Newsletter: By which means may these discrepan-
cies be balanced?
David Marsh: In a monetary union, current ac-
count deﬁ  cits for weaker, less competitive sta-
tes are ﬁ  nanced automatically, since there is no 
exchange risk. However, if the deﬁ  cits become 
ever larger, investors demand a higher risk pre-
mium, i.e., the interest rate rises. 
Currency risk is eliminated, but there is still 
credit risk - and this is what we see happening 
now, with the widening of yields on debt inst-
ruments from the less competitive EMU states.
Newsletter: What will happen if competitive distor-
tions persist?
David Marsh: The European Commission re-
port makes for some worrying reading with 
regard to the sharp rise in net external liabili-
„It is time for the ECB to put its governance 
         and public image on to a broader footing.“
David Marsh is a strategic adviser and banker combining expertise in marketing and 
communications. He previously worked with the German consultancy company Droege 
and the Hawkpoint and Flemings financial groups, after a journalistic career at the 
Financial Times and Reuters.
ties for Greece, Portugal and Spain, which were 
between 80 to 100 per cent of GDP in 2007 
against near-balance in 1995. The Commission 
says that in the period 2007-‘10, „most countries 
with overvalued real exchange rates are expected to 
losefurther competitiveness while undervalued econo-
mies will continue to gain competitiveness.“  If this 
happens, then a further rise in unemployment 
is near inevitable in the weaker states as they 
seek to bring down their labour costs.
Newsletter: What will happen next?
David Marsh: Europe’s recovery will be patchy. 
It is likely to be led by Germany and other ex-
port-orientated northern countries. Debt-bur-
dened southern and western nations – all suf-
fering from low competitiveness, large current 
account deﬁ  cits and ﬁ  nancial imbalances – will 
lag behind.
The ECB has cut rates repeatedly since Oc-
tober. The real problems will arise when they 
start to increase again.
Newsletter: What would you propose that the ECB 
should do?
David Marsh: I believe the ECB needs to do 
more to explain its policies. It is time for the 
ECB to put its governance and public image on 
to a broader footing. 
Representing the ECB’s policies is too big a 
job for just one person, so President Jean-Clau-
de Trichet needs to share the burden.Events ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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Lack of Leadership? – How GBS is responding to the current crisis
What is the role of business schools in regard of the current ﬁ  nancial and economic 
crisis? – This is a legitimate question to ask. And making reference to the rather short 
history of public Business Schools in Germany does not serve as an excuse. On a global 
level it is safe to say that there is room for improvement of business education of gradu-
ates and executives.
With the re-design of the Goethe Executive MBA program and the set-up of the new full time 
MBA program GBS has taken clear measures to enhance the education of current and future 
business leaders. For classes starting in autumn 2009 all of GBS´ MBA students will participate in 
a special High Performance Leadership Coaching track for their personal development during the 
program. 
It is a compulsory ingredient and spans over the entire length of the programs. 
This leadership coaching track comprises plenum and peer sessions as well as individual one-on-
one coaching. The process starts with a reﬂ  ection on the participants´ leadership compe-
tencies and the deﬁ  nition of personal development goals. The process is guided right 
NEWS LINES:
Goethe Business School offering NEW open 
enrollment programs starting September 09:
Leading Change – practical skills and applications 
3 starts 07 October
Managing People – new Skills and perspectives 
3starts 30 September
Impactful Communication – personal presence 
and inﬂ  uence 
3starts 19 October
Right strategic Moves – a systematic approach to 
outmaneuver the competition 
3starts 09 September
FRM - Financial Risk Manager 
3starts 05 October
Find out more about these and other courses on 
www.gbs.uni-frankfurt.de/open enrollment
from the start by professional coaches with a 
proven track record in international business 
and executive coaching. In addition partici-
pants expand their own capabilities to coach 
and are encouraged to constantly seek learning 
opportunities. Apart from these well designed 
learning processes in its MBA programs, there 
is now a variety of open enrollment leadership 
and strategy programs offered by GBS. 
In this context GBS is particularly enjoying 
the co-operation with the de Baak management 
t r a i n i n g  c e n t e r  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s .  d e  B a a k  
evolved from the largest employer organizati-
on in the Netherlands and looks back on more 
t h a n  6 0  y e a r s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  m a n a g e m e n t  
development. At the same time GBS carefully 
increases its own instructor pool in the ﬁ  elds of 
leadership and strategy.
The learning processes of the open enrollment 
programs are equally well designed. 
For programs with a focus on personal and 
leadership development the learning process 
spans over a period of 6 to 12 weeks (with up to 
6 class days) and fosters the implementation of 
learnings. In addition to its strong roots in Goe-
the University’s faculty GBS sees itself in a clear 
responsibility to develop a network of experts 
and to provide new impulses for leadership 
and organizational developmentGBS is highly 
interested in connecting with executives and 
leaders in the corporate world as well as in the 
public administration and the non-proﬁ  t sec-
tor. To listen to your questions and jointly seek 
novel solutions is one of GBS´ key goals.
Teambuilding activities set foundation 
for good teamwork from the start.
GET IT TOGETHER!Branger, N., and Schlag, C. (2008) “Can Tests Based on Option Hedging Errors Correctly Identify 
Volatility Risk Premia?” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, pp. 1055-1090.
Baums, T. (2009) „Rücklagenbildung und Gewinnausschüttung im Aktienrecht,“ 
Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt, Cologne, pp. 57.
Bertaut, Carol.C., Haliassos, M., and Reiter, M. (2009) “Credit Card Debt Puzzles and Debt Revol-
vers for Self-Control,” forthcoming in the Review of Finance.
Cahn, A. (2009) „Kredite an Gesellschafter – zugleich Anmerkung zur MPS-Entscheidung
des BGH,“ Der Konzern, pp. 67-80.
Cogan, J. F., Cwik, T., Taylor, J.B., and Wieland, V. (2009) “New Keynesian versus Old Keynesian 
Government Spending Multipliers,” NBER Working Paper Series 14782.
Faia, E. (2009) “Ramsey Monetary Policy with Labour Market Frictions,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 56:4. 
Gerlach, S., Giovannini, A., Tille, C., and Viñals, J. (2009) “Are the Golden Years of Central 
Banking Over? The Crisis and the Challenges,” forthcoming Geneva Report on the World Economy 
10, ICMB and CEPR. 
Gregory, R., Priﬂ  ing, M., and Beck, R. (2009) “The Role of Cultural Intelligence for the Emergence 
of Negotiated Culture in IT Offshore Outsourcing Projects,” forthcoming in Information Technology and 
People.
Haar, B. (2009) “Redeﬁ  ning the Concept of Securities under German Law,” Revue de Droit Bancaire et 
Financier, pp. 83.
Hinz, O., Beck, R., Skiera, B., and König, W. (2009) „Grid Computing in der Finanzindustrie,“ 
Books on Demand, Norderstedt.
Inderst, R., and Ottaviani, M. (2009) “Misselling Through Agents,” 
forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
Kraft, H., and Steffensen, M. (2009) “Asset allocation with contagion and explicit bankruptcy proce-
dures,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 45, pp. 147-167.
Langenbucher, K. (2009) “Kausalitätsbeziehungen bei der Einschaltung von Finanzintermediären, Zur 
Haftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation,” Festschrift für Karsten Schmidt, pp. 1053.
Laux, C., and Laux, V. (2009) “Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management,” 
The Accounting Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 869–891.
Maurer, R., Kaschützke, B. (2009) “Rethinking Retirement Income Strategies – How Can We Secure 
Better Outcomes for Future Retirees,” CFS Working Paper.
Muntermann, J. (2009) “Towards Ubiquitous Information Supply for Individual Investors: A Decision 
Support System Design,” Decision Support Systems, Vol. 47(2), pp. 82-92.
Schmidt, R. (2008) Microﬁ  nance, Kommerzialisierung und Ethik. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart.
Siekmann, H. (2009) “Kommentierung von Abschnitt X Das Finanzwesen (Art. 104a – 115) sowie von 
Art. 88, 91a, 91b, 120, 120a, 125c, 143c GG,” in Michael Sachs (Ed.) Grundgesetz (5th ed.), Munich. 
Wandt, M. (2009) Versicherungsrecht (4th ed.). Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
Cologne and Munich.
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Verschuldung im Mehrebenensystem – Debt in the Multi-Laye-
red German Public Administration System
Katleen Knop, University of Bonn, Baden-Baden, 2008 
(in German only)
Government deﬁ  cits and government debt have always been 
important topics for economists, lawyers and politicians. Vari-
ous attempts to slow these down in Germany (and other coun-
tries) were ﬁ  nally showing some success, partially due to legal 
requirements under the European Union Treaty of ???. In the 
course of the present crisis, however, this development has to-
tally reversed, and now both ﬁ  gures are skyrocketing at an un-
precedented speed. 
Nonetheless, the sluggish pursuit of reforming federal ﬁ  sca-
lism in Germany (Föderalismusreform II) brieﬂ  y gathered pace 
before the end of the present parliamentary session. An amend-
ment to the legal rules for both the federal and the state levels 
(Schuldenbremse) was pushed through the country’s parliamen-
tary bodies. This is primarily based on a proposal by prominent 
members of the German Council of Economic Experts. In this 
context, a book by Katleen Knop, Verschuldung im Mehrebe-
nensystem (Baden-Baden, 2008), can be highly recommended. 
It offers an in-depth analysis of the various rules for government 
deﬁ  cits at the municipal, state, federal and European levels and – 
more crucially - their coordination. The quality of the argument 
and the amount of details presented are far above those for the 
material underlying present constitutional amendments, which 
is almost unanimously considered “abysmal” by the legal com-
munity. Reading this book could have prevented the profound 
ignorance of the present rules displayed by some economists in 
parliamentary hearings. But who looks at a book of 450 pages 
instead of a thin 10-page article? 
“The Panic of 2007,” in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, Procee-
dings of the Economic Policy Symposium 2008
Gary Gorton, Yale School of Management, New Haven
How could the securitisation of a bunch of dodgy U.S. mortga-
ges trigger the largest economic crisis since the Great Depres-
sion? What are these subprime mortgages, and how exactly did 
their securitisation work? Why did banks make loans that they 
knew would almost certainly go bad? Gary Gorton’s contributi-
on to the 2008 Jackson Hole Symposium, the world’s foremost 
gathering of monetary policymakers, takes the reader through 
the nuts and bolts of subprime mortgages, their origins, and their 
interaction with securitisation of bank loans. Gorton is uniquely 
qualiﬁ  ed to provide this survey, being both an eminent historian 
of banking crises and for several years an advisor to AIG on the 
design of structured ﬁ  nancial products.
The paper substantiates several surprising and controversial 
claims: the fact that borrowers would default as soon as house 
prices would stop rising was a surprise to no one, but a conscious 
design feature of subprime mortgages; and securitisation as such 
does not have to lead to ﬁ  nancial fragility, but did so only in 
connection with subprime mortgages whose value is unusually 
sensitive to that of the underlying assets. This paper is required 
reading for anyone who wishes to understand the origins of the 
crisis we are ﬁ  nding ourselves in today.  
Available at: http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2008/Gor-
ton.03.12.09.pdf
“Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 23 (1), pp. 77-100
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Princeton University
Brunnermeier provides an excellent analysis of events that 
caused the ﬁ  nancial market crisis in 2007 and 2008. His pa-
per explains how relatively modest losses from mortgage delin-
quencies ampliﬁ  ed and led to a severe ﬁ  nancial crisis. The ﬁ  rst 
part of the paper describes recent banking industry trends: the 
“originate and distribute” model and the shortening of the matu-
rity structure of banks. It provides an event logbook on the ma-
jor developments in the capital markets and the ﬁ  nancial sector 
during the crisis until the end of 2008. The paper’s main contri-
bution is its explanation of the amplifying mechanisms behind 
the ﬁ  nancial turmoil.
Brunnermeier argues that the crisis was characterised by the 
interaction of decreasing funding liquidity, the ease with which 
market participants can borrow money by using assets as colla-
teral, and decreasing market liquidity, the ease with which mar-
ket participants can raise money by selling assets. Ampliﬁ  cation 
mechanisms were: borrowers‘ balance sheet losses that forced 
deleveraging and caused loss and margin spirals; decreasing 
lending due to moral hazard and precautionary hoarding of 
liquidity by ﬁ  nancial intermediaries; runs on issuers of commer-
cial paper and other securities without deposit insurance; and an 
interwoven network of ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Brunnermeier concludes that the current ﬁ  nancial crisis is 
special as regards the extent of securitisation and the opaque web 
of interconnected obligations, but otherwise surprisingly close 
to a „classical” banking crisis. His paper provides some impor-
tant insights into the current ﬁ  nancial crisis and convincingly 
demonstrates the fragility of the global ﬁ  nancial architecture.
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Kick-off conference:
The derivatives exchange and clearing 
house Eurex has agreed to ﬁ  nance  an as-
sistant professorship for derivatives at the 
House of Finance for a period of six years. 
The relevant contracts were signed on May 
13th, 2009, by Andreas Preuss (Deutsche Börse 
AG and Eurex) and representatives from 
Goethe University and the House of Finance.
Eurex endows 
House of Finance 
Assistant Professorship
The Macroeconomic 
Model Data Base
This project, headed by Professor Volker 
Wieland (CFS), is part of an EU-sponsored joint 
initiative by several European research institu-
tions: “Modelling and Implementation of Optimal 
F i s c a l  a n d  M o n e t a r y  P o l i c y  A l g o r i t h m s  i n  M u l t i -
Country Econometric Models”  or MONFISPOL. 
It aims to build up an archive of macroeco-
nomic models based on a common computa-
tional platform, and provide various tools for 
systematically comparing these models.  
Conference on the European 
framework directive Solvency 
II at the House of Finance
The Institut für Versicherungsrecht (directed by 
Professor Manfred Wandt) together with Pro-
fessor Meinrad Dreher (University of Mainz) 
and the Deutsche Verein für Versicherungswis-
senschaft organized a conference – “Solvency II 
in der Rechtsanwendung” – on the legal implica-
tions of this European framework directive. 
The conference, which covered topics such 
as capital requirements for insurance under-
takings, disclosure and transparency require-
ments, and the supervisory powers of public 
authorities, attracted more than 140 practiti-
oners.
House of Finance shines 
in Academic Study
A study by the Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut 
was recently published in the Handelsblatt 
newspaper which conﬁ  rms the strong posi-
t i o n  o f  Go e t h e  U ni v e r s i ty’ s  b u s in e s s  a dmi -
nistration branch. Our professors are ranked 
second, when compared to their peers in the 
rest of Germany, in terms of publishing articles 
in renowned international journals. In additi-
on, HoF professors achieved a second place in 
the study’s Finance category, just below the 
University of Zurich.
Doctoral programme in Law and Economics of Money 
and Finance (LEMF)
The new LEMF doctoral programme 
directed by Professors Brigitte Haar (Law 
School) and Uwe Walz (Economics), star-
ting in autumn 2009, will offer in-depth 
academic training to highly qualiﬁ  ed 
international postgraduates from both 
disciplines. 
The Hessische Ministerium für Wissenschaft 
und Kunst has accepted a LOEWE proposal 
called “Puzzles in Finance” that was coordi-
nated by Professor Christian Schlag. 
This proposal is concerned with investigating 
aspects of asset management under a compre-
hensive approach. A ﬁ  nal decision on the pro-
posal is expected  by end July.
House of Finance researchers success-
ful in winning best paper awards!
Jingjing Chai, Chair for the Investment, Portfolio 
Management, and Pension Finance team, has won 
the DZ Karriere Preis (an award for young acade-
mics) for her diploma thesis.
Dr. Ralph Rogalla, Chair for the Investment, 
Portfolio Management and Pension Finance team, 
has received the Frankfurter Preis für Versicherungs-
wissenschaft for his diploma thesis.
A former research assistant at the Institut für 
Versicherungsrecht,  Dr. Bastian Ganster, was 
one of three laureates for the Frankfurter Preis für 
Versicherungswissenschaft.
Dr. Michael Marx, also formerly a research 
assistant at the Institut für Versicherungsrecht, was 
awarded the Walter Kolb Prize by the city of Frankfurt.
Professor Maurer leads a panel discussion at the 10th European Asset Management Congress
During the conference held at the Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt on May 13th, 2009, 
Professor Maurer led a panel discussion with some prominent participants on the impact of 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis on the regulatory framework. There was a special emphasis on topics like 
the new European regulatory draft for the supervision of alternative investment fund mana-
gers or the levelling of regulatory standards for investment products. 
On May 15th and 16th, the programme was 
launched by a kick-off conference with inter-
national guest speakers. This was titled “Law 
and Economics of Money and Finance in Times of 
Financial Crisis”, and focused on many topics, 
including sovereign wealth funds, internatio-
nal liquidity regulation, and retail banking.
Professor Schlag submits 
LOEWE proposalQuarterly Event Calender ￿ HoF-Newsletter ￿ Quarter 2/2009
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JULY
Wednesday, 1st 
￿ Finance Brown Bag Seminar (12.00pm): “An Incentive Based View on Insurance Distribution and 
 Regulation,” Speakers: Uwe Bloos, Oliver Schellenberger, Goethe University 
￿ Seminar in Economics (4.15pm): “Using the Kalman Filter to Extract and Test for Common 
  Stochastic Trends 1,” Speakers: Yoosoon Chang, Bibo Jiang and Joon Y. Park
￿ IMFS Public Lecture (5pm): “Regulatory Responses to the Financial Crisis,” 
  Speaker: Peter Praet, Executive Director, National Bank of Belgium
Wednesday, 1st/Thursday, 2nd 
￿ Goethe Business School/European Supervisor Education Initiative Conference: “How to contribute to 
ﬁ  nancial stability - Educating supervisors as an integral part of European ﬁ  nancial supervision” 
Monday, 6th, 
￿ Ph.D. Brown Bag Seminar (12.15pm)
￿ EFL Jour Fixe (5pm): “CAPM & Co Revisited - Modeling Risk and Return on Private Equity Funds,” 
  Speaker: Timo Litty, E-Finance Lab
Tuesday, 7th, 
￿ Finance Seminar (5.15pm) with Philip Bond from the Wharton School of The University 
  of Pennsylvania – title to be announced
Wednesday, 8th, 
￿ Finance Brown Bag Seminar (12pm): “Measuring the Cost Efﬁ  ciency of German Mutual Fund Complexes: 
  A Frontier Analysis,” Speaker: Alexander Schäfer, Goethe University
Friday, 10th
￿ IMFS Symposium (2.00 p.m.): “Gesetzgeberische Maßnahmen zur Verhinderung der Übernahme börsen-
  notierter Unternehmen im Wege des ‘Anschleichens’”, Speaker: Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Theodor Baums, ILF; 
  Prof. Dr. Roman Inderst, IMFS; Dr. Roger Müller, Deutsche Börse AG
Monday, 13th
￿ Ph.D. Brown Bag Seminar (12.15pm) 
Tuesday, 14th
￿ Finance Seminar (5.15pm): “Why foreign banks withdraw from abroad,” 
  Speaker: Oskar Kowalewski, Warsaw School of Economics
￿ Seminar in Economics (5.15pm): “Leadership in Collective Action,” 
  Speaker: Esther Hauk, Instituto de Análisis Económico, Barcelona
Thursday, 16th
￿ IMFS Working Lunch (12pm): “Budget Deﬁ  cits, Debt, and Interest Rates,” 
  Speaker: Prof. Thomas Laubach, Goethe University
Monday, 20th
￿ Ph.D. Brown Bag Seminar (12.15pm)
Monday, 27th, 
￿ Ph.D. Brown Bag Seminar (12.15pm) 
AUGUST
Monday, 24th to September 4th: ILF Summer School “Bank und Kapitalmarktrecht” 
SEPTEMBER
Thursday, 3rd
￿ HoF Brown Bag Seminar (12pm), Speaker: Prof. Christoph Kühn, 
  Frankfurt MathFinance Institute 
Friday, 4th
￿ CFS Conference: “The ECB and Its WatchersXI”, Speaker (among others): 
  Prof. Volker Wieland, Goethe University and CFS – time to be announced
Monday, 7th
￿ EFL Jour Fixe (5pm), Speaker: Michael Chlistalla, E-Finance Lab 
Wednesday, 9th
￿ IMFS Public Lecture (5.00 p.m.): “Erfahrungen mit der Sanierung eines Landeshaushaltes”, 
  Speaker: Dr. Thilo Sarrazin, Senator a.D., Vorstand der Deutschen Bundesbank
￿ CFS Colloqium (5.15pm): “Management der Finanzmarktkrise aus der CFO-Sicht,” 
  Speaker: Dr. Strutz, Commerzbank AG
Thursday, 17th
￿ EFL Fall Conference: “Neun Thesen für die Zukunft des Privatkundengeschäfts”
Wednesday, 17th/Thursday 18th
￿ CFS Seminar: “Zinsprodukte: Analyse und Bewertung”
Thursday, 24th
￿  HoF Brown Bag Seminar (12pm): “Now or Never: Use the Financial Crisis to Get Serious about Customer 
 Equity  Reporting,” Speaker: Prof. Bernd Skiera 
Wednesday, 30th
￿ CFS Symposium (12pm): “DB Prize in Financial Economics” – a scientiﬁ  c discussion on themes 
  highlighted in the work of Professor Robert Shiller, Yale University, New Haven
For further details please visit our homepage:
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/veranstaltungen
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